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1 Introduction
In todays world where nearly every company is dependent on the Internet to survive, it is not
surprising that the role of intrusion detection has become extremely important within the last
decade. Intrusion detection involves determining whether some entity has attempted to gain, or
worse, it has gained unauthorized access to the system. The task of current intrusion detection
systems is detect possible threats not only from insiders but also from outsiders.
Based on our current knowledge, there are two things the system administrator could do in
order to keep secure his system. First, use preventive measures. Second, make use of the audit
logs. Due to the sheer volume of the logs, it is required that this task be performed automat-
ically. Data Mining field of study has help to partially automatize this process. However, the
current state of art has still left too much to the administrator and sometimes it distract the
administrator raising false alarms.
This work propose to apply a new technique, successfully used in others fields of knowledge
as Bioinformatics and Classification Systems, in order to define more accurately user’s profiles
and to detect more intruders, raising a lower number of false alarms and having a precision
higher than other techniques.
2 Intrusion Detection
2.1 Taxonomy of Intruders
There exist a taxonomy which helps to identify intruders into three classes, [1]:
• Masquerader: An individual who is not authorized to use the computer and who perpe-
trates a system’s access control to exploit a legitimate user’s account.
• Misfeasor: A legitimate user who is authorized for access but misuses his or her privileges.
• Clandestine User: An individual who seizes supervisory control of the system and uses
this control to evade auditing and access controls or to suppress audit collection.
Nowadays a hierarchy of hackers can be found, where two major levels can be distinguished,
[4]. At the higher level there are experienced users which have a very good knowledge of the
underlying technology. At the lower level we find programmers with a basic understanding of
how hacking tools work (e.g. those who just apply supplied cracking programs). A teamwork
involving these two levels turns out to be particularly dangerous.
2.2 Intrusion Countermeasures
There are two complementary methods to use in order to keep secure the system. First, the
usage of a complete set of preventive countermeasures which can thwart every known kind of
attack. Second, exploiting the logs in order to detect possible intrusions, a technique also known
as intrusion detection.
2.2.1 Preventive Countermeasures
The administrator should try to thwart intrusions firstly through preventive measures. Usually,
an effective way to accomplish such a task is to make use of firewalls, in order to keep outsiders
restraint. To keep the system secure from insiders the administrator should establish password-
based and privileges-based politics.
However, these tools just prevent intrusions which are attempted through known channels.
Moreover, they do not fully solve the problem of insiders behaving as masqueraders or misfea-
sors.
A new preventive measure is the usage of “honeypots”1. A honeypot is a computer on the
network with the sole purpose of looking and acting like a legitimate computer but actually
configured to interact with potential hackers in such a way to capture details of their attacks.
Honeypots are known also as a sacrificial lamb, decoy, or booby trap. The more realistic the
interaction is, the longer the attacker will stay occupied on honeypot systems and away from
the real system. The longer the hacker stays using the honeypot, the more he will disclosed
about his techniques. This information can be used to identify what he is after, what his skill
level is, and what tools he do use. All this information is then used to prepare better your
network and host defenses.
The major drawbacks with preventive measures is that they require that the administrator
to be aware of current potential threats and vulnerabilities within his computing system.
2.2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
An important study, [1], postulate that one could distinguish between a masquerader and
a legitimate user with reasonable confidence. Patterns of legitimate user behavior can be
established by observing past history, and significant deviation from such patterns can be
detected. This kind of detection is known as anomaly detection.
However, it should be noted that an anomalous sequence could be the result of three phe-
nomena (according to [5]). First, noise (typing errors), second, concept drift (working on a
different project, etc.), third, masquerader.
It is highly desirable to detect the differences between intruder’s behavior and authorized
user’s behavior. The first thing to do is to build an accurate profile. Second, provide the IDS
with the mechanism to classify either one.
In order to build an accurate user’s profile a set of measures should be thoughtfully selected
(log-in time, log-in location, favorite editor, sequence of actions, resources used, etc.).
Because of the sheer volume of audit data, both in the amount of audit records and in
the number of system features, it is not logical to think that the manager could create and
update each and every profile. Hence efficient, intelligent and automated data analysis tools
are required to discover the user’s behavior within the system.
1http://www.sans.org/resources/idfaq/honeypot2.php
Data mining techniques fit perfectly within this outline helping expert humans to develop
a concise profile and at the same time showing previously unknown behavior which is usually
scattered within the data that it is unlikely seen at a simple glance at the logs.
The major drawback of the dynamic anomaly detection approach is the need to accurately
define the boundary between acceptable and anomalous behavior. A misplaced boundary would
either alert the system managers with a false alarm or allow the entrance to an intruder and
worse modify the profile creating a back door hard to be detected.
It can be seen (figure 1) that there is an overlapping area in the intruder’s behavior and the
profile of authorized user [1]. However is should be noted that overlapped area in the misfeasor
and the authorized user’s behavior is more stressed just because it is the same person.
Figure 1: Overlapping of Intruders’ or Misfeasors’ profile and Authentic users’ profile
Anderson suggests that the task of detecting a misfeasor (legitimate user performing in an
unauthorized fashion) is more difficult than detecting a masquerader, in that the distinction
between abnormal and normal behavior may be small. Anderson concluded that such violations
would be undetectable just through the search for anomalous behavior. However, misfeasor
behavior might nevertheless be detectable by intelligent definition of the class of conditions
that suggest unauthorized usage. Finally, the detection of the clandestine user was felt to be
beyond the scope of purely automated techniques.
It was also observed in [5] that an intruder (either masquerade or misfeasor) may perform
such “anomalous” sequences repeatedly, so that their frequency becomes high enough to be
detected.
As it will be intended to show later, I do not subscribe to either suggestions. I believe that
misfeasors are detectable through a peruse study of the logs (however I do subscribe that this
task is more difficult than detecting masqueraders) and the activities of an intruder may never
become frequent enough to be detected or at the time that this happen may be to late.
3 Emerging Pattern Mining
The Emerging Pattern Mining has been proposed by Dong and Li, [2], in order to capture
significant changes and differences between datasets. The outcome of this task is a set of
patterns, called emerging patterns (EP).
Emerging Patterns are defined as itemsets whose supports increase significantly from one
dataset to another. Namely, it look for those patterns whose frequency in one dataset, denoted
D1, differ significantly from the other, denoted D2. A special kind of emerging pattern, called
jumping emerging pattern (JEP), was proposed in [3]. These patterns express peculiar features
occurring in one dataset but not in the other.
EPs have shown to be useful capturing trends in timestamped databases, building powerful
classifiers and detecting contrasts among data classes. These application resulted in more
accurate classifiers and provided a new insight of the existing data. Much of the experiments
carried out using this mining technique were conducted on datasets of bioinformatics field
related to gene sequences and cancer information.
From those experiment lets see the following example of an emerging pattern: “Lung-cancer
incidence rate among smokers is 14 times that of non-smokers”. The datasets used consist of
records from smokers and non-smokers.
The set of JEPs are interesting to our proposal because of they satisfy the property of
convexity, which means that JEP spaces can be bounded and concisely represented by their
boundary elements. This convexity property was exploited to develop efficient maintenance
algorithms to modify its boundary elements in response to changes to the data.
Definition EP and JEP (Dong & Li): A set X of items is called an itemset. A transaction
T contains an itemset X, if X ⊆ T . The support of X in a dataset D, denoted suppD(X), is
countD(X)
|D|
, where countD(X) is the number (called count) of transaccions in D containing X.
Given a number σ > 0, an itemset X is σ − frequent in D if suppD(X) ≥ σ.
For sake of simplicity let suppi(X) denote suppDi(X). The growth rate of an itemset X from
a dataset D1 to D2 is defined as
GrowthRate(X) =


0 if supp1(X) = 0 and supp2(X) = 0
∞ if supp1(X) = 0 and supp2(X) 6= 0
supp2(X)
supp1(X)
otherwise
Given a growth rate threshold ρ > 1, an itemset X is called a ρ−emerging pattern (ρ−EP
or simply EP) from D1 to D2 if GrowthRate(X) ≥ ρ. EPs whose growth rate is ∞ are called
jumping emerging patterns (JEPs).
4 Tailoring EPs to the IDS process
In order to classify the current behavior of an individual as legitimate, masquerader or misfeasor,
most classifiers require being trained with data previously classified either such as legitimate
D1 or such as intruder D2. The gist is that the amount of D2 within an IDS could be very poor
or non-existent at all. Hence, the IDS should based its classification process just on the normal
behavior. However, there can be used two datasets, one dataset consisting of the user’s profile
and the other of the recent activity.
Lets refer now to the motivation behind the usage EPs. First, classification rules obtain
by traditional methods are just a subset of EPs. Second, EPs are representable concisely even
when the EP space is huge. Third, statistical studies discover patterns of few variables in
contrast to EPs which are fitted to manage long EPs. In [2] it was shown that it is very likely
the occurrence of long EPs with much higher support than shorter EPs.
These results suggest that this technique could be of great help in any task that involve a
classification problem since its accuracy its higher, it provides new insights and it is concisely
represented. Therefore, in order to detect an intruder the proposal is to look for EPs using
the information on the user’s profile and current activities or logs. These EPs could be ranked
and showed to the system administrator. From the benefits of EPs already discussed the
administrator work should be assuaged.
In a previous section, it was mentioned that the usage of honeypots and more recently
honeynets have helped to detect more accurately intruders. EPs could assist to the preven-
tive measures detecting signatures and thus obtaining the patterns that belong exclusively to
intruder’s behavior.
Misfeasors could be detected in the same way of intruders. However, the information rec-
ollected by the miner should be canvassed to determine if it is the case of a concept drift or a
potential non-authorized activity.
In addition to the already mentioned EP assets, the JEPs have the advantage that a set of
Incremental Maintenance Algorithms have been developed, [3]. They take advantage of nearly
repeated computations on inputs that differ slightly from one another, computing new JEP
spaces incrementally.
Taking advantage of this incremental nature of the algorithms the user’s profile could be
updated according to more recent behavior more efficiently having a great impact on the system
performance.
One of the best features of EPs is its capability to capture temporal trends. As an example
of a recent discovered trend appeared in a newspaper article, [2] “Low tuition, high standards
lure U.S. students to Canada” Dayton Daily News, 10/6/2002), concerning the emerging trends
of American students studying in Canadian Universities: the enrollments of American students
in Canada has been rising by about 85% in three years to a total of about 5000. This trend is
an EP with low support but a large growth rate. It should be noted that these patterns with
low support are not seen by miners only based on the itemset support.
This ability of EPs could be used to detect misfeasors. Keeping a record of previously
discovered EPs, the administrator could notice improper behavior. For instance, lets suppose
that an authorized user access to a database which either he usually do not access or he do not
need to access to do his job, but he has privileges over it. This database is worthless to him
but it could be valuable to an outsider, for instance a competitor. Knowing that the sysadmin
analyze the user’s logs, he could access interspersedly to the database. Though, the sysadmin
see those EPs, he could disregard this information thinking that this spurious access could not
be a flaw or an indicator. This person could perform his ants-work taking along with him all the
database (having enough time). Using the EPs to detect trends, we could heed the sysadmin
as early as possible of a potencial misfeasor.
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